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ABSTRACT 
 
Contemporary Terrorist Organizations and the Threat to Michael Walzer’s Defense of a 
Supreme Emergency Exemption from Jus in Bello. (August 2009) 
Thomas Harrison Ellis III, B.A., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. John J. McDermott 
  
Michael Walzer has forwarded an argument that defends an exemption from 
adherence to Jus in Bello when a state finds itself in a situation of “supreme emergency.” 
The argument is morally problematic due to the fact that it defends the direct and 
intentional targeting of non-combatants, a restriction which has traditionally been 
considered as inviolable in the Just War tradition. This thesis seeks to demonstrate a 
further problem for Walzer’s position, the fact that his argument is sufficiently broad 
that it may be co-opted by parties whom Walzer wishes to exclude, practitioners of 
contemporary terrorism. My method will be to demonstrate certain deficiencies in 
Walzer’s argument, through analysis of the paradigm case he presents. I will then 
proceed to present two cases for the adoption of his “supreme emergency” defense by 
the terrorist organizations Al Qaeda and Hamas. I will show that both of these cases may 
ultimately fail under closer scrutiny, but will conclude that the ability for two such cases 
to be constructed demonstrates the ability for Walzer’s defense to be adopted by an 
entity which does not suffer these same failings, ultimately dooming Walzer’s argument. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Michael Walzer’s 1977 Just and Unjust Wars has been hailed as a modern 
classic. In clear and well reasoned prose, and through the use of historical example, 
Walzer develops a defense of the Just War tradition from the perspective of modern 
rights theory. Based upon the assumption that the fundamental human rights are a right 
to life and to liberty, Walzer develops a case for the state based Bellum Justum on the 
understanding that the principal rights of states are premised upon the relation of the 
state to the political body it represents. In particular, Walzer argues that the moral 
justification for the rights of states is grounded in each state’s role as protector and 
defender of the common life of the community for which it is responsible. If no common 
life exists, the state ceases to be in possession of any rights. With this foundation, 
Walzer then goes on to articulate a defense for each of the categories and proscriptions 
of the just war framework in relation to this claim. 
 The Bellum Justum has traditionally been divided into two broad areas of 
concern: Jus ad Bellum, which is the justification for states resorting to war, and Jus in 
Bello, which details the just conduct of states once engaged in war. It is this latter area of 
concern, and more specifically an argument which Walzer forwards in regards to the 
overriding of the tenets of jus in bello, which is the primary focus of this thesis. In spite 
of all the praise that Walzer’s work has received, one argument in his work has been the  
____________ 
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center of wide spread criticism. That argument involves the construction of a moral 
defense for a state’s overriding of jus in bello during situations of extreme duress. The 
name which Walzer gives to this defense is “supreme emergency”. Walzer borrows this 
name from a term used in a speech given by Winston Churchill in 1940 to describe the 
situation Britain found itself in as it faced the stark threat of Nazi aggression. Walzer 
borrows not only the term, but also the actions of Britain during that period in order to 
construct his defense. The specific action in question is the decision by British leaders to 
engage in an area bombing campaign of German cities in which civilians were the 
primary victims of attack. This decision by British leaders is morally problematic due to 
the inviolable restriction in the just war tradition against the direct and intentional 
targeting of noncombatants, individuals traditionally termed as “innocents”. 
 Walzer’s defense of “supreme emergency” is grounded in his fundamental 
concern with the primacy of political community. Given the importance of community to 
Walzer’s overall project, he argues that the defense of community is what allows a state 
to override adherence to jus in bello when the political community it represents is in 
grave danger. In particular, Walzer argues that when a state is in possession of just 
cause, is faced with imminent defeat, and that defeat would entail the destruction of the 
community it represents, the state may exempt itself from adherence to jus in bello until 
the threat is averted. 
 My interest in this specific argument of Walzer’s is the apparent broadness of the 
defense. It is my contention that the broadness of his defense allows Walzer’s argument 
to be co-opted by parties which Walzer wishes to exclude, and the ability of these parties 
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to adopt Walzer’s defense allows the argument to provide a moral defense for actions 
which Walzer categorically denies as defensible. I specifically argue that Walzer’s 
argument in its present state may be adopted as a defense for contemporary terrorism. I 
argue that, given the public statements of Osama bin Laden, a case can be made for the 
adoption of Walzer’s “supreme emergency” defense by groups such as Al Qaeda, and 
this being the case, the repercussions for Walzer’s project are dire. 
 My route towards this end will take the following path. In chapter two I will 
present a detailed review of Walzer’s “supreme emergency” defense, noting areas and 
issues which I believe weaken Walzer’s claims. I will pay special attention to the sole 
historical example which Walzer utilizes to illustrate his case, and will note that a closer 
inspection of the facts surrounding that case significantly weaken Walzer’s claims 
regarding Britain’s ability to adopt the defense. In chapter three I will construct a case, 
based upon the public statements of Osama bin Laden and noting similarity to the British 
case, which would allow for the adoption of Walzer’s defense by Al Qaeda, the terrorist 
organization which bin Laden heads. In chapter four I will proceed to rebut certain 
features of the argument presented in chapter three in order to see if Walzer’s argument 
may be salvaged in its present form. The specific means of attacking the argument 
developed in chapter three will be related to the conception of community with which 
bin Laden is working. In undermining that argument I will note that even though that 
argument may falter, a modified version may be adopted by another terrorist 
organization, Hamas, which does not suffer the same failings. I will argue that that 
argument may ultimately fail as well, but the ability for two such arguments to be 
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constructed paves the way for the adoption of Walzer’s “supreme emergency” defense 
by an entity which may not suffer such failings. I will conclude that this ultimately 
dooms Walzer’s argument in its present form. 
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CHAPTER II 
SUPREME EMERGENCY: ITS DEFINITION AND APPLICATION 
 
In his Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer presents a clear and well argued 
defense of the just war framework from the perspective of modern rights theory. Indeed, 
his work has been so influential that it has come to be regarded as a modern classic, and 
has served as the touchstone for most contemporary discussions of just war. In his book, 
Walzer defends all of the traditional categories and proscriptions of Jus ad Bellum and 
Jus in Bello by grounding them in the fundamental human rights to life and to liberty. 
However, while Walzer’s work has met with much praise, there is one particular 
component of his discussion which has met with significant criticism, and that is his 
defense of a state’s exemption from adherence to Jus in Bello during situations of 
extreme duress. The name that Walzer gives to such a defense, and which he borrows 
from Winston Churchill, is “supreme emergency” (Walzer 2006, 251). According to 
Walzer, a “supreme emergency” is one in which a state is out of options and fighting for 
the very existence of the political community it represents. Given such a situation, where 
the state essentially has its “back against the wall”, Walzer contends that it is possible to 
give a moral defense for actions that according to jus in bello would be strictly 
prohibited. The nature and scope of this defense is what I will examine here. 
 Traditionally, the just war framework has been viewed as a middle position 
between two very different political viewpoints, political realism and pacifism. States are 
usually defined as those institutions of government which are put in place to protect the 
rights of a people in a given territory, and political realism denies the claim that the 
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actions of states are analogous to the actions of persons, and thus denies that moral 
concerns have any place in discussions of state actions or in discussions of the 
interaction between states. From the perspective of political realism, morality is solely 
the concern of persons, and as states are not persons, the use of violence by the state is 
not subject to the same restrictions as the use of violence by persons because states do 
not exist within the moral realm. The sole concern of states is the maintenance and 
protection of the state, and sometimes violence is a tool towards that end, nothing more 
and nothing less. From the perspective of pacifism, violence is never justifiable, and 
therefore the use of violence by states can never have any defense. The just war 
framework developed as a compromise of sorts, an understanding that sometimes states 
cannot resolve their differences without resorting to violence. Given this sad fact, just 
war theorists, grounded in the belief that it is sometimes morally permissible for states to 
wage war, developed a set of criteria aimed at limiting the harm of state violence. 
Towards this end, just war theorists have identified two broad areas of consideration, jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello, and have historically modeled the defense of these criteria 
upon common law conceptions of interactions between individual persons.  
Jus ad Bellum, consistent with the aim of minimizing the harm of war by limiting 
the occasions when states can justifiably enter into hostilities, concerns itself with the 
requirements a state must satisfy prior to engaging in war. There are many requirements 
for the satisfaction of jus ad bellum, such as the resort to violence being a matter of last 
resort, deriving from right intention and with an aim towards peace, the declaration of 
war coming from legitimate authority, there being a probability of success, and justness 
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of cause. Of these, justness of cause is seen as the principle consideration and is 
traditionally defined as a response to aggression, where aggression is generally defined 
as the use of force in violation of the basic rights of another. 
Jus in Bello becomes a consideration once states find themselves engaged in war, 
and finds as its principle concern the proper conduct of states and their agents in the 
waging of war. Given the just war aim of containing and curtailing the violence of war, 
the two principles of jus in bello are: 1) proportionality of means and ends, which aims 
at limiting the application of force solely to what is necessary to achieve legitimate 
military objectives, and 2) discrimination, which aims at distinguishing legitimate from 
illegitimate targets of attack. Of these two, discrimination is viewed as the primary 
consideration, as it aims at guaranteeing that violence is only directed at those 
institutions and persons who are directly engaged in harming. What allows the 
application of force against those engaged in harming is a forfeiture of the right to not be 
attacked as a consequence of their belligerence. Non-combatants, those persons who are 
not engaged in harming, are to be exempt from attack because they are free from any 
actions which have caused them to lose their rights. In fact, from the just war 
perspective, non-combatants are to be protected as much as possible from attack, and 
this point is emphasized in the traditional labeling of non-combatants as “innocents.” 
The extent to which innocents must be protected is somewhat a matter of dispute, with 
theorists such as Grotius arguing that non-combatant immunity is a principle so 
inviolable that it “cannot be changed, even by God” (Orend 2006, 141), but the vast 
majority of theorists allow for occasional harm towards non-combatants so long as that 
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harm is not intentional and is consistent with the doctrine of double-effect. The 
protection of innocents is considered as foundational to the just war framework, and 
hence why Walzer’s defense of an exemption from jus in bello requires scrutiny since 
this defense allows for the direct, intentional targeting of innocents. 
Walzer’s defense of a “supreme emergency exemption” to jus in bello has three 
requirements, two explicit and one implied. The explicit requirements are that the threat 
of defeat is imminent, and that defeat brings with it the very real threat of destruction of 
the political community for which the state is responsible. The implied requirement is 
that the state making the appeal to “supreme emergency” has justness of cause on its 
side. It is this implied requirement which I will address first. 
Justness of cause is usually defined as a response to aggression, either in self 
defense, or in defense of another who is a victim of aggression. Aggression is usually 
defined as the use of armed force against another’s basic rights, with the principle rights 
of states being the right to territorial integrity and political sovereignty. Traditionally, 
this rights violation has been seen as taking the form of classical military strikes, such as 
the invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany in 1939 or the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 
1990. In the commission of an act of aggression the aggressive state is viewed as 
forfeiting its own rights and thus subject to attack in response, either by the party that is 
the victim state, or by third parties acting on behalf of the victim state. Walzer, however, 
in arguing for the defensibility of preemptive strikes, extends the definition of aggression 
to include not only the actual use of force, but also the anticipation of the use of force in 
violation of a state’s rights. According to Walzer, when a state takes up an aggressive 
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posture, and manifests an intention to act upon this posturing, the state is already guilty 
of aggression and hence has forfeited its right not to be attacked. Many contemporary 
theorists agree with Walzer on this point, but it is a position that is at odds with some 
classical theorists such as Vitoria who insists that one must wait for an actual attack 
before going to war to fend off the attack (Orend 2006, 77). Given the traditional 
modeling of just war criteria upon interactions between individuals, Vitoria’s position is 
understandable as it is often the case in conflicts between individuals that aggressive 
rhetoric and posturing never actually manifests into actual violence. But given the level 
of violence that states can bring to bear, Walzer’s defense of anticipatory strikes seems 
to have much merit. In a conflict between individuals a melee will rarely entail death, 
but in conflicts between states death and destruction on a grand scale is often the case.  
The issue, however, is that Walzer’s defense of preemptive attack hinges upon a wider 
conception of the definition of aggression, one which opens up a significant gray area in 
terms of interpretation, and may give states grounds for resorting to violence under the 
impression that they have justness of cause, when in fact the resort to violence may not 
be necessary and may actually be at odds with the just war aim of an eye towards peace. 
An example of this may be seen in the current situation in Iraq. Prior to the March 2003 
invasion of Iraq, the United States made a compelling case to the international 
community that Iraq, under Saddam Hussein’s regime, posed a credible and imminent 
threat to the United States. The argument was made that the Hussein regime had access 
to a considerable store of weapons of mass-destruction, was guilty of a history of 
aggressive policies against its own people and other states, such as its attack upon the 
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Kurds in Northern Iraq and its invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and had thereby 
demonstrated a willingness to deploy such weaponry in violation of the rights of others. 
In addition, it was argued that the Hussein regime was forming alliances with groups, 
such as Al Qaeda, who had no qualms with employing those weapons against western 
states such as the United States and this served to further magnify the threat that Iraq 
posed. Thus, the Hussein regime was portrayed as posing a grave and imminent threat, 
and this threat justified a preemptive strike by the United States and its allies. After the 
invasion, of course, much of this evidence has been shown to be in error, and thus the 
United States’s justness of cause in this particular situation has come into question. This 
may not, in and of itself, undermine Walzer’s extending the definition of aggression in 
order to justify preemptive first strikes, and may in fact simply require the addition of a 
significant “due care” component, but it does raise questions of how states acquire 
justness of cause in situations where they have not yet been directly attacked.  
States, by definition, only gain their rights from the rights of those for whom they 
are responsible. States thus have an obligation to safeguard the rights of their people. If 
the basic rights of their people are a right to life and to liberty, surely the right to safely 
pursue those rights must also be guaranteed, and thus the state must do all within its 
power to guarantee the safety of those whom it represents. But in guaranteeing the safety 
of the governed, the question arises as to how much leeway we are to afford states in 
protecting the safety of their people when the state’s protecting the rights of its citizenry 
may come at the expense of the rights of others. Walzer is clear that fear alone is not 
sufficient to justify preemptive action under the guise of justness of cause, that there 
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must also be credibility of threat in order to gird the appeal to justice, but we cannot 
dismiss the fact that fear plays an important role in the interpretation of threats, and thus 
may be an issue in how states come to view themselves in possession of justice when 
they resort to violence. Fear is difficult to quantify, and its effect upon how states 
perceive and interpret threats cannot be disregarded. It is the fact that fear plays a crucial 
role in how states and their representatives interpret and respond to threats which I 
believe may pose considerable issues for other components of Walzer’s theory, such as 
his defense of a “supreme emergency” exemption to jus in bello, for fear may cloud the 
interpretation of what counts as aggression, and with it a state’s understanding of its 
possession of justness of cause. 
 A state’s understanding of its own justness of cause is significant due to 
Walzer’s appeal to a “sliding scale” of justifiable means, which helps to buttress his 
defense of “supreme emergency.” As he puts it, “the truth about war rights is best 
expressed in terms of a sliding scale: the more justice, the more right” (Walzer 2006, 
229). What this means is that, according to Walzer, justness of cause grants a state 
considerably more discretion in the actions it may perform in defense of its rights, and 
thus a state which considers itself as in possession of justice may employ significantly 
more violence in relation to its perception of its possession of justice. The reasoning 
behind this is closely allied to Sherman’s famous dictum that “war is hell,” and with it 
his view that “war is entirely and singularly the crime of those who begin it, and soldiers 
resisting aggression (or rebellion) can never be blamed for anything they do that brings 
victory closer” (Walzer 2006, 32). Walzer’s sliding scale is a bit more refined than this, 
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but the idea is essentially the same in regards to what a state which considers itself a 
victim may do in its own defense. The implications of this putative possession of justice 
must therefore be factored into any understanding of Walzer’s theory if it is to serve as a 
normative guide for the application of political violence. 
Turning aside further considerations of justness of cause for the moment, let us 
consider the other criteria Walzer requires for an appeal to “supreme emergency.” The 
first of these two explicit criteria is the imminence of defeat. In order to justify 
abandoning the war convention, by which is meant “the set of articulated norms, 
customs, professional codes, legal precepts, religious and philosophical principles, and 
reciprocal arrangements that shape our judgments of military conduct” (Walzer 2006, 
44), defeat must loom as a real and close threat. The proximity of defeat is required in 
order to justify “fighting dirty”, as the closeness of defeat is, in Walzer’s view, what 
magnifies the threat faced by the victim state. When the very real threat of defeat by a 
hostile and aggressive enemy looms near, the necessity of staving off defeat is what 
justifies the resort to otherwise impermissible action. The imminence of defeat is what 
puts a state under the rule of necessity, and, as Walzer notes, “necessity knows no rules” 
(Walzer 2006, 254). But what does it mean for defeat to be imminent? For Walzer this is 
a situation when a state has its “back against the wall”, a situation “when conventional 
means of resistance are hopeless or worn out, anything goes (anything that is necessary 
to win)” (Walzer 2006, 252). But this, too, seems to contain an implicit perceptual 
component. The example that Walzer uses as his sole paradigm case of a justified appeal 
to “supreme emergency” is the decision by Britain during World War II to utilize 
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indiscriminate bombing of German cities as an offensive weapon. I will examine this 
example in greater detail below, but it is worth noting here that the apparent imminence 
of defeat which framed Churchill’s description of Britain’s predicament in 1940 may not 
have been as dire as his rhetoric seemed to convey. If defeat was not as close as it might 
have seemed, and this historical event serves as the paradigm case for normative 
guidance, then we find another possible extension of the application of Walzer’s 
“supreme emergency” doctrine to cases which Walzer may not have intended. Just such 
an application will be the subject of the next chapter. 
Let us, however, assume that imminent defeat is faced. Does this alone justify 
appeal to extraordinary measures? According to Walzer it does not. Imminence of defeat 
must be conjoined with a grave threat of what that defeat would entail before an appeal 
to “supreme emergency” can be satisfied. The threat must be severe, and its nature of a 
sort that it threatens not only the state which faces defeat, but also the very political 
community that state represents. It is the nature of the threat faced, a threat which must 
be “of an unusual and horrifying kind,” (Walzer 2006, 253), that when coupled with the 
closeness of defeat grants a moral defense for an otherwise immoral action, and hence 
accounts for the paradoxical nature of Walzer’s defense, a moral defense for an action 
that remains immoral. So, what types of threats count? Walzer admits that it is difficult 
to give a definitive account, and thus he is only able to paint the “rough contours of the 
map” (Walzer 2006, 253). He uses the example of the threat to Britain during World 
War II posed by Nazi Germany, which he admits lies at the far end of the spectrum, as a 
clear example of the type of threat severe enough to warrant appeal to “supreme 
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emergency,” and thus that threats of a lesser degree may also count if they are 
sufficiently like the Nazi case to bring the victim state under the rule of necessity. Even 
though Walzer gives us only one example, we see in it the nature of the threats that he 
has in mind and those are threats which attack at the core of political communities, 
threats which endanger the very ongoingness1 of the political community, “the survival 
and freedom of political communities – whose members share a way of life, developed 
by their ancestors, to be passed on to their children – are the highest values of 
international society” (Walzer 2006, 254). Thus it would seem that any threat which 
seeks to undermine a political community’s way of life, its very conception of self, 
seems to count. It is this characterization which, given that it also implies a certain 
subjective conception of identity, opens Walzer’s doctrine to greater application than he 
might have intended. 
Having now reviewed the conditions required for appeal to “supreme 
emergency,” we must examine how it is put into use as Walzer intends this doctrine to 
serve not only as a theoretical exercise, but also as a normative guide for political leaders 
during wartime. As stated above, Walzer only gives us one example, the decision by 
British leaders during World War II to carry out a campaign of indiscriminate bombing 
of German cities. With this as Walzer’s sole example, it must serve as the paradigm 
case, and thus any deficiency in the example may reveal deficiencies in Walzer’s 
defense. 
                                                 
1 This term is Walzer’s. He uses it when referencing the importance of historicity and 
continuity to community. 
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The situation that Britain faced in 1940 was indeed dire. With the fall of France 
in 1940, and with the United States and the Soviet Union not yet in the fight, Britain 
remained the sole European state fighting against Nazi aggression and thus was left to 
shoulder the full weight of all the Nazi war machine could bring to bear. Having failed to 
stop the Nazi invasion of Norway, and with it Nazi access to the supply of iron ore 
shipping from Norwegian ports which allowed Nazi Germany to maintain its 
accumulation of war materiel, the question British leaders faced involved what means 
they had available to prevent defeat by Nazi Germany and how best to respond to the 
threat that they faced. The answer they came up with was the use of air power. British 
leaders viewed Bomber Command as the sole effective offensive weapon available to 
them and thus decided to utilize it to initiate a bombing campaign directed at German 
cities. What this decision entailed was significant, for it required abandonment of the 
war convention.  
At the time British leaders made their decision to bomb German cities the 
accuracy of navigational equipment was severely deficient, and this impacted bombing 
precision: Bomb hits within a 5-mile radius of the intended target were the norm and 
considered as a success. In addition, German air defenses were strong enough to make 
daylight attacks virtually ineffectual and therefore requiring bombing raids to be run at 
night, which increased the likelihood of errant delivery of ordnance. Given these 
realities, the decision by British leaders to adopt a heavy air offensive against German 
cities was made with the full knowledge that primarily non-combatants would fall victim 
to the bombing. This knowledge did not dissuade British leaders, and in fact, attacks 
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against non-combatants formed part of the intention behind the decision. A significant 
component of the strategy was an attack against the morale of the German people, an 
attempt to undermine their support of the aggressive Nazi regime. In addition, the attack 
against the German people was viewed as justified as a reprisal for the Luftwaffe attacks 
on London and Coventry, which gave British leaders apparent further justification for 
their decision to employ methods in which civilians would suffer the greater harm. This 
decision, however, given it involved the direct and intentional targeting of non-
combatants, was directly at odds with the war convention, and thus at odds with 
morality. The issue before us, then, is might some moral defense be given for the 
decision by British leaders to pursue this bombing campaign against the largely innocent 
German populace? According to Walzer the answer is yes.  
The reason for Walzer’s claim that a moral defense for the decision by British 
leaders to bomb German cities can be given is his claim that this was clearly a case 
which falls under the “supreme emergency” exemption. If he is correct, then Britain at 
the time must have satisfied all three conditions for the application of this defense. There 
is little doubt that Britain possessed justness of cause. Britain entered the war in response 
to the Nazi invasion of Poland, and thus the justness of cause requirement would clearly 
be met under the auspice of “other defense against aggression.” The issue then is 
whether or not Britain fully satisfied the other two conditions of “supreme emergency”: 
1) imminence of defeat and 2) gravity of threat faced. 
There is no question that the threat Britain faced at the hands of Nazi aggression 
was of an “unusual and horrifying kind,” and one that would annihilate the political 
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community of Britain. Nazi occupation of the British islands would have entailed the 
undermining of all basic norms of the British people as they had developed over 
hundreds of years, and there is sufficient evidence that Hitler intended to remake Britain 
in line with his conception of a New Order in Europe. This would likely have manifested 
first with the systematic elimination of all the leadership elements in Britain, as had been 
the case in Poland after the Nazi invasion there, to be followed by the employment of 
more draconian measures against the rest of the British populace. There were plans in 
place by the Nazis for the mass deportation of British workers to Germany to work in 
factories and on farms - part of this plan stipulated that the entire “able-bodied male 
population between the ages of seventeen and forty-five will … be interned and 
dispatched to the Continent with the minimum of delay” - as well as a strict requisition 
of foodstuffs and raw material well beyond that required for the bare subsistence of the 
population (Fleming 1957, 260-264). It goes without saying that a Nazi invasion of the 
British homeland would have also entailed the deportation of all British Jews to 
European concentration camps to join their continental brethren. Thus it is clear that the 
gravity of threat criterion was safely satisfied by the British as they assuredly faced 
slavery and massacre at the hands of the Nazis should Britain fall. This leaves us with 
one final consideration, was the threat of defeat imminent? 
For there to be an affirmative response to the question of imminence of defeat, 
British leaders would have had to have no other military means of resistance available 
other than the indiscriminate bombing campaign they proposed, and a Nazi invasion of 
Britain would have also needed to be a real and close threat. The certainty of both of 
 18
these is questionable. While Nazi Germany did devise a plan for an invasion of the 
British islands, Operation Sea Lion, its ability to execute this plan would require air 
superiority over Britain, as well as either a significant increase in its naval power, or 
some other means to minimize the superior capabilities of the British navy. A successful 
amphibious invasion of Britain would have required overcoming the vast disparity 
between the British and German navies. The British navy was significantly stronger than 
the German navy, and this strength was magnified by the fact that the German 
Kriegsmarine had lost a large part of its destroyer fleet in the invasion of Norway, either 
to direct loss or battle damage. Furthermore, the strongest arm of the German 
Kriegsmarine was its U-boat fleet, but this would be of little use in the relatively shallow 
and narrow British Channel and thus their strength in this regard could not be considered 
as a factor. In addition, the German Kriegsmarine was not in possession of any 
specialized landing crafts that would be required for an amphibious invasion of Britain, 
the requirement for such vessels a fact which Nazi Germany recognized after the 
invasion of Norway in 1940. The construction of the specialized landing crafts needed 
would have taken a considerable amount of time. Thus, during the planning stages of 
Operation Sea Lion, small merchant vessels and river craft were modified for use while 
plans for the specialized landing crafts required could be drawn up and put into 
production. Without access to vessels specifically designed for the task, however, the 
probability of a successful amphibious invasion of Britain rested squarely upon air 
superiority to support a channel crossing through Britain’s defenses. The question of 
dominance of the air over Britain was effectively settled during the Battle of Britain, 
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which led to the indefinite shelving of Operation Sea Lion on 17 September, 1940. Thus 
the imminence of defeat criterion may be called into question, as it appears that an air 
campaign directed against German civilians was not necessarily the only means 
available to British leaders to protect the British homeland. Of course, one could argue 
that the difficulty of a successful amphibious invasion of Britain, coupled with the 
British victory of the Battle for Britain, was not sufficient to negate the threat that 
Britain faced, but it does call into question the proximity of defeat, and that proximity is 
required for Walzer’s argument to hold. 
Perhaps, however, protection of the British islands was not the sole obligation 
faced by British leaders in 1940. In order to salvage the argument for their appeal to 
“supreme emergency,” and thus give a moral defense for the actions they took in waging 
an air campaign against German civilians, we need to extend the obligation of British 
leaders not only to their own people, but also to the peoples for whom they initially took 
up arms in defense. Walzer does not argue this point, but given the realities of the 
strategic situation presented above, I believe that such an expansion of responsibility 
may be required in order to maintain the imminence of defeat criterion. If no extension is 
added, the argument falters. Thus this extension, it could be argued, would make the 
British leaders responsible not only for the protection of their own citizenry, but also for 
those who had already been conquered by Nazi Germany. If this is correct, as I believe it 
is, it would make British leaders responsible for lands far beyond their own borders. The 
addition of this extension, which in effect is an expansion of the political community for 
whom the leaders are responsible, in turn also makes British leaders responsible for a 
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larger portion of territory, and we can then imagine their understanding of the situation 
as akin to that faced by a government whose territorial rights have been trampled and, 
though their capital (the British Islands) may be safe, is nonetheless on the verge of 
defeat given the loss of all territories surrounding the capital. It is not hard to imagine the 
leaders of Britain viewing themselves as in just such a situation. Britain entered the fight 
on behalf of Poland, in response to Nazi aggression there. This justness of cause via 
“other defense against aggression” presented a willful assumption of responsibility for 
those conquered peoples in Poland who had been wronged, and as the war proceeded 
also for those peoples in the conquered lands of their allies. The assumption of that 
responsibility, based perhaps on a “people like us” notion of community, may be what is 
crucial to maintaining the satisfaction of the criterion of imminent defeat. In the apparent 
need of this assumption of responsibility to maintain the success of Walzer’s defense in 
this paradigm case, we see an implication of responsibility which Walzer does not 
address. I believe the absence of any address of this requirement opens up Walzer’s 
defense to far greater adoption than he anticipates, given the multiple ways this 
extension of responsibility may be construed. In the extension of areas of responsibility, 
the door is opened for states to assume rights violations against themselves and their 
political communities which do not fit the generally understood conception of the 
relation between states and those they are legitimately charged with protecting. 
In the discussion above, I believe it is clear that there are certain assumptions in 
Walzer’s defense of “supreme emergency” that he does not directly address. The notion 
of justness of cause of course carries with it a certain subjective component. I doubt that 
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any nation that wages war views itself as lacking possession of justice, even if their 
perception of that justice is in error. Given the classical conception of justice in war, 
however, it is easy to see who is actually in possession of justice, the one who was 
initially attacked and anyone who comes to the defense of another that has been the 
victim of initial attack. The wrong is seen as being the first to resort to violence, for this 
commission of violence necessarily is in violation of another’s rights. But Walzer’s 
expansion of the definition of aggression, by the addition of the criteria for the 
justification of anticipatory attack, widens that definition to also sometimes include the 
party that initiates the resort to violence. When one factors in the role that fear plays in 
the interpretation of perceived threat, which is critical to an expanded definition of 
aggression, the notion of justice is no longer as black and white an assessment as 
previously conceived. This is significant, because the “sliding scale” grants greater 
discretion in the application of violence to those who are in possession of justice. Thus 
any ambiguity in the possession of justice needs to be clarified beyond any doubt. 
Coupling this vagueness in regards to the possession of justice with the idea of expanded 
responsibility noted above, which I believe is best premised on the notion of an extended 
conception of political community, we can see further issues for Walzer’s defense. If I 
am correct that this expansion of responsibility is best construed as an extension of the 
role of community, based on an understanding of Britain as taking up arms on behalf of 
others with whom they shared at least some similarity in regards to resistance to Nazi 
aggression, a further broadening of the appeal to “supreme emergency” can  be seen in 
its adoption by those who may perceive themselves as acting on behalf of others who are 
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unable to resist those who are believed to be acting against their fundamental rights. This 
would further open up the path to adoption of this defense by parties Walzer might wish 
to exclude. An example of this will be given in the next chapter as we direct this 
discussion to the nature of the failings of Walzer’s current defense of “supreme 
emergency” by construction of an argument that allows for the adoption of his defense 
by the terrorist organization Al Qaeda. Walzer has categorically denied that any defense 
for terrorism can be given. As we shall see, however, a plausible defense of 
contemporary terrorism can be given. That defense is Walzer’s own. 
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CHAPTER III 
TERRORISM, OSAMA BIN LADEN, AND SUPREME EMERGENCY 
 
 
 September 11, 2001 is a date that brought the names of Osama bin Laden and Al 
Qaeda, the organization he heads, into the collective consciousness of all Americans, as 
well as the rest of the world. Prior to that date, for most Americans “terrorism” was a 
term that cropped up occasionally, usually only in passing due to a story on the nightly 
news regarding goings on in distant lands, and thus rarely with any sense of urgency and 
without any sense of shared victimhood. On the morning of September 11, 2001 
however, the world saw a coordinated attack on multiple high-visibility targets, 
perpetrated by a group of extremely motivated individuals which resulted in the deaths 
of thousands of unsuspecting victims. The world was changed, and we with it. 
 Shortly after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the 
crash in Pennsylvania of a fourth hijacked airliner re-routed towards Washington D.C. 
by its hijackers, American leaders rapidly identified those behind such heinous crimes. 
The group they identified as the culprit was known as Al Qaeda and this group’s leader a 
man by the name of Osama bin Laden. The Bush administration was quick to liken the 
attacks of September 11, 2001 to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, 
which initiated the entrance of the United States into World War II. With this 
characterization of the attacks, the Bush administration thus declared that we were now 
at war, a “war against terrorism.” I do take some issue with the defining of this conflict 
as a “war against terrorism.” It is, after all, hard to wage war against such a nebulous 
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entity, let alone make it conform to the traditional tenets of the Bellum Justum. That 
issue notwithstanding, I believe that the administration had it at least partially correct. 
We were and are at war, for this is how our enemies view the conflict, and thus how they 
define and defend the actions that they take. It is crucial that we understand this, for if 
we do not understand our enemies and their motivations, viewing them only in 
caricature, we may never hope to resolve the issues which underlie the current conflict 
and hence find no end to this terrible situation that we currently find ourselves mired in. 
More importantly, if this is indeed a war, then it stands to reason that the just war 
framework can serve as a guide to our moral understanding of the relevant issues at 
hand: the principle issue before us being whether or not there can be any justification for 
the moral permissibility of acts deemed as “terrorism.” 
 Before addressing the issue of whether or not “terrorism” can have any moral 
defense, some agreement on terminology must be found. There is not yet any universally 
accepted definition of the term, but it may be possible to come up with something which 
is sufficient to the task before us. Walzer states that terrorism’s “purpose is to destroy 
the morale of a nation or a class, to undercut its solidarity; its method is the random 
murder of innocent people. Randomness is the crucial feature of terrorist activity” 
(Walzer 2006, 197). Will this characterization do? I do not believe that it will. This 
characterization is problematic for two reasons. First, it undermines the possibility of 
moral assessment of acts labeled as “terrorism” due to the fact that the definition labels 
such acts as murder, as unjustified killings, in the definition itself. It begs the question of 
whether or not the killings committed can have any justification by assuming that they 
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have no justification at the outset. As Andrew Valls notes, “the trouble with this 
approach is that it prejudges the substantive moral issue by a definitional consideration” 
(Valls 2002, 564). Secondly, this definition is problematic because it hinges on the 
randomness of the targets. It might appear that the victims of such acts are random, but it 
very well could be the case that the victims are no more random than the targets of 
legitimate acts of war. Randomness is, after all, a matter of perspective. Terrorists often 
take great pains to choose their targets for maximum effect, and thus the killings of 
workers at a ball-bearing factory during a militarily legitimate bombing raid could be 
seen as just as “random” as the killing of the workers in the Pentagon on September 11, 
2001, depending upon which viewpoint one takes. In addition, Walzer’s definition fails 
to note any political motivation, and political motivation seems to be a key component of 
most, if not all, acts that fall under the heading of “terrorism,” as it is now generally 
understood from the contemporary practice of this form of violence. Thus Walzer’s 
definition seems insufficient to the task.  
Valls, in noting the deficiencies in definitions such as the one posed by Walzer, 
offers the following: “my stipulative definition of terrorism … is simply that it is 
violence committed by non-state actors against persons or property for political 
purposes” (Valls 2002, 565). This definition captures the political motivation which 
seems characteristic of all contemporary acts of terrorism, but is not without its own 
problems. First, it is extremely broad. Under the definition offered by Valls, many 
actions which we would not generally conceive of as acts of terrorism would be labeled 
as such. For example, Scott Lowe notes that under Valls’ working definition the 
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destruction of a mayor’s mailbox by a group of rebellious teens upset over her support of 
some local ordinance they disagree with would be labeled as a terrorist act. This of 
course seems absurd, as most would view it simply as an act of vandalism and nothing 
more (Lowe 2003, 102). The broadness of Valls’ definition therefore seems at least 
somewhat at odds with ordinary usage of the term, and that will not aid us in coming up 
with a term sufficiently useful for moral assessment. Further, one glaring omission in 
Valls’ definition is any note of the fact that states, too, can commit acts of terrorism. 
This omission, however, is noted by Valls as its exclusion was on purpose. The goal of 
his paper was an attempt to argue that at least some acts of “terrorism,” specifically 
those committed by non-state actors, can conform to the just war framework, and 
thereby have some justification or be open to moral consideration. He assumed that acts 
of terrorism by states would fall under the scrutiny of the just war framework, and the 
morality of those actions judged from that perspective. Valls’ approach in that paper is 
not our primary purpose here, and I believe we can safely expand his definition to 
include states, though that expansion will require further amendment in order to 
differentiate state terrorism from other legitimate acts of war. Any such amendment to 
include state sponsored terrorism will not get us around the issue of broadness without 
even further revision. 
How then to define the term “terrorism”? Our discussion so far has found fault in 
the definitions offered by Walzer and Valls, but those failings have at least provided 
some insight into what a working definition must include. Any working definition must 
include that terrorist acts can be committed by both state and non-state actors. It must 
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further include the stipulation that the objective is political in nature, the intent must be 
towards achieving some political aim, and is also usually aimed at innocents. Some may 
wish to be more forceful, and state that only acts of violence against innocents count, but 
I think that would be too restrictive. Limiting our definition to include only attacks 
against innocents would require us to exclude attacks against military targets, such as the 
bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen on October 12, 2000 or the bombing of the 
Marine barracks in Beirut on October 23, 1983. Both of these attacks are generally 
viewed as acts of terrorism, and thus if we are to aim for a working definition that 
comports with ordinary usage, we must be careful to not limit our definition solely to 
attacks upon innocents. Thus I believe we may arrive at a working definition of 
“terrorism” as “indiscriminate violence committed by state or non-state actors against 
property or persons with the intent of affecting political change.”  
I realize that this definition may still be disputed by many, particularly because I 
have failed to include the inducement of terror or fear as a component of the definition, 
which many authors believe a requirement. I agree with Valls that such an explicit 
inclusion is not necessary to a working definition of “terrorism.” Even if it were, any 
such qualms would be sufficiently addressed by the stipulation that the intent is to affect 
political change, as the inducement of fear could be a means towards that end. Therefore 
I believe this definition will suffice for the remainder of this discussion. 
Having arrived at a working definition of “terrorism,” the question before us now 
is whether or not any act of terrorism may be morally permissible? The definition I have 
offered stipulates that terrorist acts are acts of political violence, and as such fall under 
 28
the purview of the just war framework. The definition also specifies that the acts must be 
indiscriminate in nature, which would place such acts at odds with the jus in bello 
requirement for discrimination, that is the avoidance of directing violence at those not 
directly engaged in harming. It would seem that these acts must necessarily be viewed as 
immoral due to their indiscriminate nature. Does this mean that no moral defense can be 
given? I believe the answer to this question is no. A moral defense can be given, as 
evidenced by Walzer’s defense of Britain’s terror-bombing of German cities during 
World War II. The indiscriminate bombing of German cities by Britain clearly counts as 
an act of terrorism under the definition I have forwarded above, and as such would be 
classified as an immoral action. Walzer does not deny this, yet he maintains the claim 
that a moral defense of this action may still be given in the form of his “supreme 
emergency” exemption from the requirements of jus in bello. It might be argued that 
Walzer’s defense of “supreme emergency” seems inconsistent. After all, Walzer admits 
that his defense of the British terror-bombing of German cities does not remove the 
immorality of the decision to directly target innocents, but merely provides a moral 
defense for the British leaders who made that decision. He admits to no inconsistency, 
but simply states that any apparent inconsistency is due to the paradoxical nature of the 
defense, a defense for those “special cases where victory is so important or defeat so 
frightening that it is morally, as well as militarily,  necessary to override the rules of 
war” (Walzer 2006, 132). I will not at this point address this particular concern, but will 
simply accept Walzer’s classification of “supreme emergency” as paradoxical. 
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If a defense of Britain’s use of terrorism may be given, would such a defense 
work in other cases? I believe the answer to this question is yes. Surely any state that 
finds itself in essentially the same situation as Britain faced in 1940 would be able to 
appeal to Walzer’s “supreme emergency” doctrine. In fact, as there is no explicit 
component in Walzer’s defense that stipulates “supreme emergency” as available only to 
states, his defense may also extend to non-state actors, provided that they, too, are able 
to satisfy the criteria that Walzer has put forth.  What, then, would such an argument 
look like?  
The application of Walzer’s “supreme emergency” defense rests upon three 
requirements. First, the agent or agents appealing to “supreme emergency” must have 
justness of cause. Second, defeat must be imminent and no other practical means of 
resistance available. Finally, the defeat must entail a significant harm, a threat which will 
undermine the very character of the political community at risk, and not solely a threat to 
the state which is responsible for that political community. If these three criteria are 
satisfied, an appeal to “supreme emergency” may be made. Unfortunately, Walzer gives 
us but one example of a clear appeal to this doctrine, the case of British area bombing 
during World War II. This case, then, will serve as the paradigm against which to gauge 
other appeals to Walzer’s doctrine. 
Having defined a working definition of “terrorism,” and provided a brief 
overview of the fundamental requirements for appeal to “supreme emergency,” I now 
wish to see if Walzer’s defense would apply to at least some terrorist activity. I believe it 
will, for it is my contention that Walzer’s defense is not as restrictive as he believes, and 
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thus is open to adoption in a far larger number of cases than he would wish to admit. If 
his argument for the overriding of jus in bello does cover at least some of these cases, 
then it may reveal more significant problems for Walzer’s argument than the mere 
appearance of inconsistency. 
The specific case I have in mind is adoption of a “supreme emergency” defense 
by the terrorist organization known as Al Qaeda. I believe, based upon the public 
statements of the leadership of this organization, that they view themselves as facing a 
threat sufficiently like the one faced by the British in 1940, and based upon this they 
might likewise be able to make appeal to the same defense for their targeting of 
innocents. A review of these public statements, and the statements of Osama bin Laden 
in particular, reveal a rhetoric which ostensibly is couched in just war terminology. 
There are frequent references to rights vindication, to being victims of aggression, and to 
attempting to save the umma, the nation or community of Islam, from extinction. It could 
be argued that the usage of these terms is purely a form of rhetorical flourish, and does 
not necessarily reveal their motivations, but the same could be said of the usage of this 
terminology by any state or political figure, and thus I see no initial grounds for 
dismissing them. 
Before presenting a parity case from the public statements of Al Qaeda’s 
leadership to Walzer’s defense of the decision of British commanders during the darkest 
days of World War II, it might help to first briefly review the history of the rise of 
Islamic fundamentalism in order to better understand the context from which Islamist 
appeals to violence against innocents arise. The growth of Islamic fundamentalism has 
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its roots in the fall of the Ottoman Empire following its defeat at the end of World War I. 
After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Arabic-speaking peoples sought to form an 
independent Arab state or states. During the interwar years, they were subject to British 
and French colonialism, but this did not quell their desire for independence. In fact, this 
Western influence brought with it notions of secular nationalism and modernity which 
further spurred many Arab thinkers’ drive for independence. This independence came in 
the years following World War II, and with it expectations of modern societies with 
dynamic economies and powerful armies as a result of adherence to the values gained 
from this Western influence. These expectations were not met, and the early years of 
independence were marred by autocratic leaders, repressive governments, overcrowded 
cities and failed economies. The rise of the state of Israel furthered this disillusion with 
Western ideals. The failure to achieve an independent Arab state in Palestine due to 
Israel’s victory in the Arab-Israeli War of 1948-49, and with it the expulsion of close to 
three-quarters of a million Palestinian Arabs from their homes, followed by the crushing 
defeat of a coalition of Arab states in the Six-Day War of 1967, was viewed as 
catastrophe, which is evident in the terming of the creation of the state of Israel and all 
that it entailed as al Nakba, the “catastrophe.” This view was further exacerbated by the 
loss of Jerusalem, the third holiest city in Islam, in the 1967 Six-Day War 
In the aftermath of theses events, Arab scholars attempted to analyze the cause 
behind these failings. Some argued that the issue was not a failing of the adoption of 
Western secular ideals, but the failure to effectively and efficiently modernize. In short, 
the more modern state won. This view, however, was overshadowed by the views of a 
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group of thinkers who came to be known as Islamic Fundamentalists. These Islamic 
Fundamentalists argued that Israel won the 1967 war because they had stayed true to 
their faith, while the Arab states had failed precisely because they had not. Still other 
Islamic Fundamentalist thinkers took it further, and argued for the abandonment of 
Western ideologies and a return to Islam. The continued failings of these secular 
governments in the years that followed the 1967 defeat did nothing but fuel the flames of 
this movement, and the growing popularity of this viewpoint is a critical component of 
the understanding of community, embodied in the umma, that has shaped the view of 
Osama bin Laden and the members of Al Qaeda. The situation was succinctly expressed 
in an article which appeared in the Economist shortly after the attacks of September 11, 
2001: 
The past three decades have provided fertile ground for these ideas. Nearly every  
Muslim country has experienced the kind of social stress that generates severe  
doubt, discontent and despair. Populations have exploded. Cities, once the abode  
of the privileged, have been overrun by impoverished, disoriented provincials.  
The authoritarian nature of many post-colonial governments, the frequent failure  
of their great plans, and their continued dependence on western money, arms and  
science have discredited their brand of secularism. The intrusion of increasingly  
liberal western ways, brought by radio, films, television, the Internet and tourism,  
has engendered schism by seducing some and alienating others … The 
Palestinian struggle, in particular, has stoked rage against not only Israel and its 
backers, pre-eminently the United States, but also the feebleness of Arab and 
Muslim governments in the face of them.2 
 
Before we proceed to the construction of a “supreme emergency” parity case for 
the actions of Al Qaeda, a few words regarding Islam seem necessary to further fill in 
                                                 
2Enemies within, enemies without. 2001. Economist, 22 September. 
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the context of the arguments forwarded by Al Qaeda. Islam is both a religion and a 
sociopolitical system. There is no separation of mosque and state in Islam. This has its 
foundation in the life of the Prophet Mohammed, who served not only as a religious 
leader, due to his receiving of the Koran via divine revelation, but also served as a 
political figure. He conducted affairs of state, engaged in diplomatic interactions with its 
neighbors, and fought wars against its enemies. His life serves as the model for Islamic 
fundamentalists who argue for hakimiyat Allah, God’s rule, under which shari’ah, divine 
law, holds sway. Shari’ah is a comprehensive body of laws which is drawn primarily 
from commandments, precedents and prohibitions found in the Koran and the Sunna. 
The Sunna is a collection of the words, practices, and habits of the Prophet Mohammed 
as recorded in the Hadith, which are collections of the words and deeds of the Prophet 
Mohammed as transmitted by reliable witnesses. Emulation of the Prophet Mohammed 
is seen as fundamental to living a life in accordance with God’s rule, which entails 
adherence to shari’ah, and hence is the basis for Al Qaeda’s insistence that any Islamic 
state which usurps shari’ah with secular law ceases to be legitimate.  
Now that we have addressed necessary background considerations, we may 
return to the issue at hand, which is the construction of a case for the adoption of a 
“supreme emergency” defense for Al Qaeda’s actions. In order to construct this defense 
it will be necessary to show that, from the perspective of Osama bin Laden and Al 
Qaeda, all three requirements for appeal to “supreme emergency” have been met. These 
requirements are justness of cause, imminence of defeat, and defeat entailing dissolution 
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not only of the state, but the political community that it represents as well. Of these, 
justness of cause is primary. 
In the just war framework, justness of cause is traditionally viewed as a response 
to aggression, where aggression is usually defined as the use of violence against the 
rights of another. It is obvious from bin Laden’s words, such as when he states “The 
latest aggression was one of the worst catastrophes to befall the Muslims…It was the 
occupation of the land of the two holy mosques” (bin Laden 2004,14), that this is exactly 
how he perceives the issue. He elsewhere argues: 
For over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in 
the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, … and turning its bases in the 
Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim 
peoples…The best proof of this is the Americans’ continuing aggression against 
the Iraqi people (bin Laden 2004, 57) 
 
 
 Bin Laden views the state of Israel as built upon wrongful acquisition of Muslim lands, 
by violation of the rights of Palestinian Muslims who were displaced in 1948, and more 
specifically by Israel’s occupation of Jerusalem. By extension, he would appear to view 
the United States strong and continued support of Israel as making the U.S. complicit in 
these putative acts of aggression. This is evident in his common reference to the 
“Jewish-Crusader alliance,” a view which was no doubt reinforced by President George 
Bush’s unfortunate choice of words when on September 16, 2001 he characterized the 
newly christened “war on terrorism” as a “crusade” in an off-hand comment to reporters.  
It is not only U.S. support of Israel, however, that bin Laden views as making the U.S. 
guilty of aggression, but also the continued presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia 
which he specifically cites in the fatwa, a legal opinion or decree, he issued in 1996, and 
 35
again in the fatwa he issued in 1998.3 To bin Laden, it makes no difference that the US 
was invited by Saudi leaders prior to the first Gulf War, an invitation extended in 1990 
to assist in the security of Saudi Arabia from possible Iraqi aggression and repel the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. The Saudi government is a secular government, and thus in bin 
Laden’s eyes an illegitimate one. Therefore their invitation does not excuse the presence 
of U.S. troops on Saudi soil, land which bin Laden views as sacred given the presence of 
Islam’s two holiest sites, Mecca and Medina, within its territorial boundaries. In bin 
Laden’s eyes, the continued U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia counts as an occupation, as 
evidenced in the 1998 fatwa wherein he states, “for over seven years America has been 
occupying the lands of Islam in its holiest of places, the Arabian peninsula” (bin Laden 
2004,57). Thus it would appear that bin Laden views himself, and all members of the 
umma, as victims of aggression and therefore in possession of justness of cause. 
Justness of cause, however, needs to be supplemented by imminence of defeat 
and gravity of threat faced before an appeal to “supreme emergency” may be adopted. 
Demonstrating imminence of defeat, however, is often difficult to prove, especially in 
the case of bin Laden and Al Qaeda. The reason for this is due to bin Laden and his 
followers’ absolute belief in the justness of their cause, and the belief that they are acting 
in accordance with God’s command. They firmly believe that victory will be theirs if 
they and their fellow Muslims stay the course and adhere to a strict doctrine of jihad. 
                                                 
3 The 1996 fatwa is commonly referred to as the “Declaration of Jihad Against the 
Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques,” which is a shortening of its 
full title and may be found on pp. 13 – 28 of the FBIS compilation in the reference 
section. The 1998 fatwa is commonly referred to as “Al-Qaeda’s Declaration of War 
Against Americans” and it may be found on pp. 56-58 of the FBIS compilation in the 
reference section. 
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Nevertheless, in bin Laden’s appeals to Muslims to take up the cause of jihad, his 
rhetoric continually seems to emphasize the urgency of the situation and thus the need 
for Muslims throughout the world to take up arms in defense of the umma. His rhetoric 
constantly emphasizes the urgency with which the umma, the community of Islam, needs 
to take up the cause of jihad to avert disaster. This apparent urgency, this appeal to 
fellow Muslims to fly to the banner of jihad, lest they too fall victim to the “Jewish-
Crusader alliance,” I believe, reveals a perceived understanding of the precariousness of 
their situation, and thus the imminence of threat to the umma should swift action fail to 
be taken. And it is in language of this sort that I believe bin Laden reveals his perception 
of the putative threat to the umma as akin to that faced by Britain in 1940. An example 
of such appeals based upon urgency may be seen in statements such as that found in a 
tape released by bin Laden in January of 2004 wherein he states: 
The occupation of Iraq is a link in the Zionist-Crusader chain of evil. Then comes   
the full occupation of the rest of the Gulf states to set the stage for controlling 
and dominating the whole world…O Muslims: the situation is serious, and the 
misfortune is momentous” (bin Laden 2004, 273)  
 
 
In other portions of this tape he argues that the rulers of the Gulf states are incapable of 
repelling any American attack. Conjoined with his characterization of the situation 
above, I believe a case can be made that bin Laden views the threat of defeat as 
imminent, at least as much as the British did in 1940 in their war against Nazi Germany, 
and thereby would satisfy the second criterion required for appeal to “supreme 
emergency.” 
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 The final requirement for appeal to “supreme emergency” is related to the gravity 
of the threat faced. In order to successfully appeal for an exemption from jus in bello, the 
threat faced must be of an unusual and horrific kind. It must be of the sort that it is a 
threat to the very ongoingness of the community under attack. The threat faced by 
Britain was one of enslavement and massacre, and there is little doubt that this is exactly 
how bin Laden perceives the situation. His language is fraught throughout with 
references to massacre and horrific injustice, such as seen in his appeal to the Muslim 
community in the fatwa issued in 1996 wherein he states: 
 You are not unaware of the injustice, repression, and aggression that have  
befallen Muslims through the alliance of Jews, Christians, and their agents, so 
much so that Muslims’ blood has become the cheapest blood … your blood has 
been spilled in Palestine and Iraq4 … and all false claims about human rights fell 
under the blows and massacres committed against Muslims everywhere. (bin 
Laden 2004, 14) 
 
That bin Laden perceives the threat faced exactly as of the sort Walzer cites is no clearer 
than when he states “the Zionist-Crusader alliance against the Islamic nation today is the 
most dangerous and rabid ever, because it threatens the entire Islamic nation, its religion 
and existence” (Berner 2007, 103). Thus it would appear that, from the perspective of 
bin Laden and his followers, the threat they face is of the sort that overriding traditional 
just war restrictions on conduct is a matter of necessity. 
                                                 
4 Bin Laden is likely here referencing attacks upon retreating Iraqi soldiers during the 
final days of the Persian Gulf War along the so-called “Highway of Death.” The heavy 
toll exacted upon the retreating Iraqis was much publicized in the media, and is 
frequently invoked as an example of an apparent violation of the principle of 
proportionality called for by jus in bello. 
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 The argument constructed above suggests that bin Laden does in fact believe his 
community to be in a situation of “supreme emergency” consistent with Walzer’s 
conception of the term. This is problematic for Walzer because he has invoked a 
categorical denunciation of contemporary forms of terrorism when he states that “the 
practice [of terrorism] is indefensible now that it has been recognized, like rape and 
murder, as an attack upon the innocent … it cannot be defended” (Walzer 2004, 51-52). 
For Walzer, terrorism cannot be defended, even by appeal to “supreme emergency.” 
 Against the imminent threat of political and physical extinction, extreme  
measures can be defended…But this kind of threat has not been present in any of  
the recent cases of terrorist activity. Terrorism has not been a means of avoiding  
disaster but of reaching for political success (Walzer 2004, 54).   
 
 
How then are we to reconcile the apparent inconsistency here? Some critics have argued 
that this is simply due to Walzer being unwilling to follow through with what is entailed 
by his position. I, however, believe that this apparent inconsistency is based upon two 
things: 1) Walzer’s defense of “supreme emergency” being broader than he recognizes, 
and thus encompassing a defense of actions which Walzer does not wish to defend, and 
2) a fundamental misunderstanding upon the part of Walzer of the argument(s) 
forwarded by bin Laden. The first issue I believe has been made clear by the ability to 
frame a defense of Al Qaeda’s actions in the paragraphs above. The second needs further 
addressing. 
 As noted in the passage quoted above, Walzer does not believe that 
contemporary forms of terrorism can ever be justified due to his contention that they are 
not attempts to fight for freedom in the face of disaster, but are instead attempts to 
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achieve “political success” through coercion. He views contemporary Islamic terrorists 
not as freedom fighters, but as “revolutionary terrorists” who indiscriminately kill 
innocents in order to “spread fear through a whole population and force the hand of its 
political leaders” (Walzer 2004, 130). To emphasize this point, he further states that 
“Islamic terrorists don’t call themselves freedom fighters; they have a different mission: 
to restore the dominance of Islam in the lands of Islam” (Walzer 2004, 133). This view 
is, however, problematic. Osama bin Laden frequently invokes the cause of freedom, 
arguing that Muslims are fighting for their freedoms, such as when he states “We have 
been fighting you because we are free men who do not remain silent in the face of 
injustice. We want to restore our Muslim community’s freedom” (Berner 2007, 58). 
Thus Walzer’s claim that Islamic terrorists do not call themselves “freedom fighters” 
seems mistaken. They do, in fact, conceive of themselves as such. Furthermore, based 
upon bin Laden’s conception of community, the claim of response to rights violation 
does have some basis in light of the Palestinian situation. Even if Israeli and Palestinian 
descriptions of the “Palestinian exodus” differ,5 one cannot simply overlook the claims 
of close to three-quarters of a million displaced Palestinians Arabs, especially in light of 
continued Israeli rebukes of the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and 
failure to halt continued construction in the contested settlements. There appears to be a 
legitimate rights claim at issue here, and under bin Laden’s conception of the umma, a 
                                                 
5 The “Israeli Government claimed that the Palestinian Arabs left because they were 
ordered to and were deliberately incited into panic by their own leaders, who wanted the 
field cleared for the 1948 war”. While “The Palestinian Arabs charge that their people 
were evicted at bayonet-point and by panic deliberately incited by the Zionists” 
(Childers 1970, 183). 
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unified Islamic community, an attack upon the rights of Palestinian Muslims is 
conceived of as an attack upon the rights of all Muslims. In light of this, it would not 
appear that bin Laden’s claims of being a “freedom fighter” can be so easily dismissed, 
nor with it the arguments he forwards. Further, it would seem that the aims of Islamic 
terrorism are in fact political in nature, a fact which Walzer appears to fail to recognize. 
In particular, given the priority which Walzer places on political communities, it is odd 
that he apparently overlooks this political appeal to defense of community. 
  Walzer also claims that contemporary terrorism should be categorically 
denounced because it is “commonly the first resort of militants who believe from the 
beginning that the Enemy should be killed and who are neither interested in nor capable 
of organizing their own people for any other kind of politics” (Walzer 2004, 135). From 
Walzer’s perspective, the British bombing of German cities was an actual last resort, but 
terrorism seems to be the first resort of Islamic terrorists. It is easy to understand how 
Walzer may have come to that conclusion. After all, Al Qaeda does not appear to have 
made any overt appeals to political discourse prior to engaging in acts of violence. But 
this is, once again, where the notion of political community comes into play. Bin Laden 
conceives of himself and Al Qaeda’s members as fighting on behalf of a political 
community that has attempted to resolve their grievances politically, only to have those 
attempts fail catastrophically. He thus does at least appear to perceive of the resort to 
violence as a matter of last resort. Bin Laden’s perception of the failure of alternative 
political methods is evident when he stated in a 1999 Time interview:  
 the PLO in Palestine, or the so-called Palestinian Authority—have been trying  
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for tens of years to get back some of their rights. They laid down arms and 
abandoned what is called “violence” and tried peaceful bargaining. What did the 
Jews give them? They did not give them even 1% of their rights (bin Laden 
2004, 86). 
 
He believes that attempts to work through the political process in Muslim countries have 
failed precisely because the rulers of those countries are mere puppet dictatorships who 
are operating on behalf of Western interests and not due to any unwillingness or inability 
to participate in the political process. They have, in bin Laden’s view, lost their 
sovereignty. Bin Laden is clearly operating under the perception that terrorism is a 
matter of last resort when he states it became “impossible to repel these Americans 
without assaulting them” (bin Laden 2004, 84). If bin Laden perceives the resort to 
violence as a matter of last resort, he is again making arguments that are consistent with 
the just war framework and which would seem to buttress any appeal to “supreme 
emergency.” 
 Finally, Walzer believes that contemporary Islamic terrorism can have no 
justification because it is characterized by a desire to eliminate an enemy that has been 
“radically devalued,” and is  
directed against entire peoples or classes, [tending] to communicate the most 
extreme and brutal intentions—above all, the tyrannical repression, removal, or 
mass murder of the population under attack (Walzer 2006, 203). 
 
 
According to Walzer, the message that contemporary terrorists are communicating is 
therefore “a denial of the peoplehood and humanity of the groups whom [they] find 
victims” (Walzer 2004, 59). This seems too facile an understanding of the claims of 
contemporary terrorists such as bin Laden, for it is not exactly clear that his aims are 
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based upon a denial of the peoplehood or humanity of Americans. In his October 2004 
appeal to the American people,6 bin Laden explains his reasons behind his role in the 
attacks on the World Trade Center and repeatedly makes claims that the American 
public has been misled by the Bush administration. He implores the American public to 
carefully consider all that he has to say. Many of the claims he makes in this address 
may be spurious, but the fact that he is at least attempting a reasoned appeal to those 
who are the primary targets of his attacks seems to undermine Walzer’s claim that 
contemporary terrorists are communicating a “denial of personhood” of those against 
whom they are directing violence. 
It seems, therefore, that Walzer is operating under a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the backgrounds and motivations of contemporary terrorists. The 
language they use and the reasons they present are entirely consistent with appeals to the 
just war framework in defense of a resort to violence. Frequent appeals to defense of 
community, vindication of rights, failure of non-violent methods to resolve claims and 
disputes are issues that cannot be overlooked without at least some investigation to 
determine their validity. Walzer’s misunderstanding, in turn, allows him to overlook the 
fact that they are forwarding arguments, not merely presenting excuses. More 
importantly, the fact that they are forwarding arguments, and arguments that cannot 
simply be dismissed outright, opens the path for their adoption of his “supreme 
emergency” defense. Thus, if Walzer wishes to contest their adoption of his doctrine, he 
                                                 
6 The full text of bin Laden’s speech is available on-line at the following URL: 
http://english.aljazeera.net/archive/2004/11/200849163336457223.html  
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will need to shore up his defense in order to prevent its assumption by parties he wishes 
to exclude. 
Before closing this chapter, I should note one possible objection to the discussion 
above, and that is that regardless of bin Laden’s perceptions, there may be facts 
regarding the state of affairs in the Middle East that call into question many of his basic 
assumptions, and with them any appeal to Walzer’s “supreme emergency” doctrine. I 
believe, however, that even if the argument presented above in support of the Islamic 
community being in a state of “supreme emergency” falters under closer scrutiny, the 
fact that a prima facie case can be constructed at all has serious repercussions for 
Walzer’s doctrine. In the next chapter I intend to more fully explore this possible 
objection. I believe that in carefully considering how the argument forwarded above may 
be undermined, possible avenues of salvaging Walzer’s doctrine from abuse may be 
revealed. It is to this examination that I now turn. 
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CHAPTER IV 
IS SUPREME EMERGENCY A SUSTAINABLE DOCTRINE? 
 
 
 In the previous chapter I presented a case, based upon the public statements of 
Osama bin Laden, for the adoption of Michael Walzer’s “supreme emergency” defense 
by the terrorist organization known as Al Qaeda. I noted that Walzer’s argument, as it 
currently stands, could be adopted by Al Qaeda if we take bin Laden at his word and 
assume that his statements reveal his perception of the situation in the Middle East, and 
thus his organization’s apparent grounds for resorting to violence. I also noted that the 
argument from bin Laden’s perspective that I presented might ultimately fail in light of a 
more critical interpretation of the situation in the Middle East, for regardless of bin 
Laden’s perception of the situation there may be facts which would undermine the 
validity of his perceptions. If his perceptions do not comport with the facts, then the 
argument falters. Nevertheless, even if that argument ultimately fails, I believe the fact 
that a prima facie case such as this can be constructed forces a more critical review and 
possible reconstruction of Walzer’s doctrine. The fact that such an argument could be 
forwarded, I believe, reveals the broadness of Walzer’s argument. This broadness, when 
coupled with other issues noted in chapter one, opens Walzer’s defense up to abuse, and 
if “supreme emergency” is to stand as a normative guide for political leaders in 
desperate times, it behooves us to make sure that the doctrine is clear. Given the 
implications of its application, there simply is no room for ambiguity. 
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 The argument forwarded in the previous chapter can be attacked on two possible 
fronts: 1) the legitimacy of bin Laden and his organization to make decisions regarding 
overriding of jus in bello restrictions, and 2) bin Laden’s conception of community being 
insufficient to count for the defense. Of the two, legitimacy is likely to be the first means 
of attack from the just war perspective. The ability to declare and wage war, after all, is 
reserved to the sovereign by the jus ad bellum requirement of right authority. According 
to the just war framework, only the state has the authority to declare and wage war, and 
in Walzer’s defense of “supreme emergency” it falls to the state to make the decision to 
invoke the overriding of jus in bello when the three necessary criteria of “supreme 
emergency” have been met. How then can Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda purport to 
make this decision in light of the fact that they apparently are not duly authorized to do 
so? The answer lies in the fact that Islam makes no clear distinction between mosque and 
state, Islamic law is supreme. The state, according to Islamic fundamentalism’s strict 
interpretation of Islam, is merely a tool of Allah, and the state only gains legitimacy 
through governance in strict accord with the divine law as revealed in shari’ah. Every 
facet of life is to be governed in accordance with shari’ah. Bin Laden and Al Qaeda thus 
view themselves not as the authors of the decision to wage war and attack innocents, but 
merely as enforcers of what they view as divine fiat. They might thus respond to this 
criticism by arguing that the failure of their own legitimacy is not the issue, for they 
view the authority for their actions and proclamations as coming directly from God. He 
is the author. When they issue declarations of war, such as the 1996 and 1998 fatwas, 
these are seen not as the issuance of orders deriving from Al Qaeda’s authority, but 
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rather as interpretations of divine decree revealed by them. This is evident in release of 
these proclamations as fatwas, which are scholarly rulings upon divine law. Al Qaeda 
might therefore deny the charge of illegitimacy in regards to their authority to issue a 
call of the faithful to jihad, and insistence of the validity of directly targeting innocents 
in the name of jihad, on the basis that they are not bound by this particular requirement 
given their position as agents, not authors. This view could be buttressed by an appeal to 
Walzer’s defense for the classification of guerilla forces as legitimate agents of a 
political community. In addressing the classification of guerilla forces, and thus their 
treatment under the war convention, Walzer argues that the war rights of guerrilla forces 
would be equivalent to the war rights afforded uniformed soldiers should the guerilla 
forces possess sufficient support from the populace. It is the support of the populace that 
makes the guerilla forces an instrument of the people. As Walzer argues: 
Soldiers acquire war rights not as individual warriors but as political instruments, 
servants of a community … Guerillas take on a similar identity whenever they 
stand in a similar or equivalent relationship (Walzer 2006, 185) 
 
 
 Al Qaeda, as an organization operating independently of any recognized state, may 
believe itself in possession of this popular support given the apparent wide acclaim in 
the Muslim community for their leader, Osama bin Laden,7 and claim that this 
                                                 
7 In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks there was a wide-spread outpouring 
of support for Osama bin Laden in many corners of the Muslim world. The news was 
rife with images of massive rallies and parades expressing admiration and support for 
bin Laden and Al Qaeda’s successful attack on the United States. That support has not 
appeared to have declined significantly. An Al-Jazeera survey of 41, 260 of its readers 
released on the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks revealed that 49.9% of those polled 
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strengthens their position as agents of the Nation of Islam. Whether or not this would be 
sufficient to undermine the legitimacy attack on the ability of Al Qaeda to adopt 
Walzer’s “supreme emergency” defense would require more space than I wish to 
dedicate here as I do not believe that an attack upon bin Laden’s authority as an agent of 
the Muslim nation will prove sufficient to save Walzer’s doctrine in its current form. My 
reason for abandoning this particular approach is due to the fact that a modified version 
of the argument forwarded in the last chapter could be adopted by either Hamas or 
Hezbollah. Both of these organizations have similar aims as Al Qaeda, yet also serve as 
apparently legitimate political entities in their respective territories and thus might be 
able to circumvent any appeals to authority in order to deny access to a “supreme 
emergency” defense. I therefore believe that even if bin Laden and Al Qaeda fail the ad 
bellum legitimacy requirement, Walzer’s doctrine still stands in jeopardy. It would thus 
seem that the more promising means of attacking the argument forwarded in the last 
chapter is an attack upon Al Qaeda’s conception of community. Before attempting that, 
however, we must consider the notion of community that is relevant to Walzer’s 
position. 
The importance of community to Walzer’s thought cannot be underestimated. It 
is the foundation upon which his framing of the Bellum Justum is built. Given the 
importance of this concept, it is a shame that Walzer fails to give us a specific definition, 
instead opting only to paint the rough contours. There may be reason behind this, of 
course, for too restrictive a definition may undermine his project of building a general 
                                                                                                                                                
supported bin Laden. <http://terrorism.about.com/b/2006/09/11/al-jazeeras-readers-on-
911-499-support-bin-laden.htm> (28 May 2009). 
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defense of the just war framework based upon rights theory and premised upon the 
relation between community and state. If he forwards a definition of community that is 
limited to only a small set of political communities, his overall project in regards to the 
Bellum Justum is significantly weakened. The issue before us in this discussion, 
however, requires a clear understanding of what qualifies as a political community for 
Walzer, due to the fact that so much hinges upon his conception. In particular, the value 
of community is what provides the basis for appeal to the “supreme emergency” defense. 
As Walzer writes: 
When our community is threatened, not just in its present territorial extension or 
governmental structure or prestige or honor, but in what we might think of as its 
ongoingness, then we face a loss that is greater than any we can imagine, except 
for the destruction of humanity itself. We face moral as well as physical 
extinction, the end of a way of life as well as a set of particular lives, the 
disappearance of people like us. And it is then that we may be driven to break 
through moral limits that people like us normally attend to and respect (Walzer 
2004, 43) 
 
 
We here see the criticalness of community to our discussion, and with it the need to 
understand exactly what Walzer is identifying as community. Without a solid grasp upon 
what does and does not count in this regard we are left to find significant fault in 
Walzer’s argument. We must therefore examine more carefully the characterization of 
community that Walzer presents in order to see how an attack on the conception of 
community that bin Laden is using may be framed.  
The principle good of community, for Walzer, is the common life which it 
represents. This common life is a function of the historical development of the people 
that form the community, a product of their combined experience. “Over a long period 
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of time, shared experiences and cooperative activity shape a common life” (Walzer 
2006, 54), and this common life acts as a covenant between past, present, and future 
members of the community. It is akin to “Edmund Burke’s description of the political 
community as a contract between ‘those who are living, those who are dead, and those 
who are yet to be born’” (Walzer 2004, 42-43). Walzer notes, however, that the term 
“contract” is an inappropriate metaphor since it is impossible to conceive of how such a 
contract could have been agreed to. In referencing Burke, he notes that: 
there is an important truth here nonetheless: we do try to carry on, and also 
improve upon, a way of life handed down by our ancestors, and we do hope for 
recognizable descendants, carrying on and improving upon our own way of life. 
This commitment to continuity across generations is a very powerful feature of 
human life, and it is embodied in the community (Walzer 2004, 43). 
 
From this it is clear that Walzer conceives of community as an historical entity, its value 
born of the labor and input of the members over time to develop the unique character of 
the community. This unique character then becomes incorporated into the individual 
members and frames their world view. As Walzer notes: 
The political community is probably the closest we can come to a world of 
common meanings. Language, history, and culture come together (come more 
closely together here than perhaps anywhere else) to produce a collective 
consciousness. National character, conceived as a fixed and permanent mental set 
is obviously a myth; but the sharing of sensibilities and intuitions among 
members of a historical community is a fact of life (Walzer 1984, 28). 
  
The political community is, for Walzer, where a significant notion of identity is born, 
where “individuals compose and from which they derive some portion of their character, 
practices and beliefs” (Walzer 2004, 42). The community is thus central to identification, 
and represents something above and beyond the set of its members. This notion of 
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identification is important to Walzer’s overall theory, for it forms the basis for the 
relationship between the rights of individuals and the rights of states. Walzer identifies 
the basic rights of all individuals as a right to life and a right to liberty. The rights of 
states to political sovereignty and territorial integrity are based upon these individual 
rights. It is not necessarily a direct transfer, but rather a function of the role of 
community. The rights of the state are born out of the union of the rights of the 
collective individuals that form the political community which the state represents.  
The right to political sovereignty is grounded in the right of the people to decide 
how they wish to be governed, and this right is consistent with the “common life” which 
is the core of community as Walzer conceives it. But what are we to make of the right to 
territorial integrity? The answer is that it “derives from the common life [the state’s] 
members have made on this piece of land” (Walzer 2006, 55). What we see here is an 
acknowledgement of a close connection between community and territory. Surely the 
members of a community need somewhere to live, but the right to territorial integrity is 
more than that. It is about the specific relationship to the land. It is not unlike the 
connection between house and home. A house is merely a structure, but a house 
becomes a home as a product of the experiences of its occupants. Similarly, the right to 
territorial integrity is based upon the community’s history of shared experience within a 
given region. This emphasis upon a common life in a specific area of territory may prove 
beneficial in attacking the argument forwarded in the last chapter, but it may not be 
sufficient to save Walzer’s defense of “supreme emergency” without significant 
revision. 
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From this brief discussion we now have a better grasp upon what Walzer means 
by community, and political community in particular. We are able to identify its key 
components for Walzer’s project, the most relevant characteristic being the common life 
shared by its members. This common life is born over time, through shared experience 
and cooperation. It is identified with a given territory, through the relation of the people 
to the land, which is likewise a function of the common life. Given this characterization, 
it would appear that the closest manifestation of this type of community is the modern 
nation-state. The question before us then, having identified the characteristics of political 
community as Walzer conceives it, is does the umma of bin Laden possess these 
characteristics? 
 The primary weakness in the bin Laden argument is the conception of 
community that bin Laden is using. Bin Laden frames virtually all of his arguments and 
appeals upon protection and advancement of the umma, the nation or community of 
Islam. His notion of community encompasses all the people of Islam, viewing them as a 
unified whole, where commonality of religion overshadows anything else, and this 
allows him to overlook any differences that may to others seem significant. His working 
conception of community allows him to view an affront to any subgroup as an offense to 
the community at large. This, in turn, permits him to view himself as a vindicator for 
rights abuses against any portion of the umma. This is seen in his frequent references to 
the Palestinian issue, to embattled Bosnian Muslims, and other Muslim groups 
throughout the world who find themselves in conflict. It is this emphasis upon 
community, coincidentally, which allows his adoption of Walzer’s “supreme 
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emergency” defense as Walzer’s doctrine is premised upon the prominence of 
community. As Walzer notes:  
If the political community were nothing more than a neutral framework within  
which individuals pursued their own versions of the good life, as some liberal 
political theorists suggest, the doctrine of supreme emergency would have no 
purchase. (Walzer 2004, 44) 
  
 
The notion of community therefore is critical, and the ability of bin Laden and Al Qaeda 
to adopt Walzer’s doctrine hinges upon the umma satisfying Walzer’s conception of 
political community. There are, however, some difficulties with this, for while the 
members of the umma, as bin Laden conceives it, may share a commonality of religion, 
that alone may not be sufficient to satisfy the notion of a common life which is critical to 
qualification of the sort of political community that Walzer has in mind. 
 As we noted above, the principle component of political community as Walzer 
conceives it is a common life. This common life is born of a history of shared experience 
and cooperative effort to construct a way of life consistent with the unique character of 
the community. How might Al Qaeda claim this of the umma? Their best claim to 
possession of something like this would be appeal to shari’ah. Shari’ah means “the 
path” or “the way”. It is a comprehensive body of laws which is drawn from the Koran 
and Sunna and which governs virtually all facets of Islamic society, including such 
everyday issues as finances, economics, dress codes, and familial obligations. Given Al 
Qaeda’s insistence upon the priority of adherence to shari’ah for identification as a 
Muslim, and in particular their insistence that the only legitimate governments are those 
which govern in accordance with shari’ah, they might thus insist that a common life is 
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found in adherence to shari’ah given this broad scope of its authority. Such an appeal 
would certainly satisfy the historical aspect, and given the widespread categories of 
application of shari’ah law might also capture other components of the way of life 
component that Walzer notes in his characterization of community, but I suspect that an 
appeal to shari’ah alone might not satisfy Walzer’s conception sufficiently. Adherence 
to a system of rules and directives does not seem to fully express the idea that Walzer is 
getting at when he talks about the common life of a community as something that leads 
to identification with others in the community as “people like us”. Though adherence to 
shari’ah might grant an apparent commonality to the community of Islam, I doubt that 
that alone will do. My reasoning here is because identification as a Muslim does not, in 
and of itself, seem to be sufficient to overcome other relevant differences in regards to 
political community, differences that transcend mere identity as a Muslim.  
The Muslim world is comprised of a vast number of different ethnic groups, with 
unique languages, cultures, and histories. The conjunction of these elements forms a 
source of identification among these different peoples. They may be Muslims, but they 
do not define themselves by that fact alone. One need only look at the situation of the 
Kurds to see this. The Kurds comprise the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East, 
and for centuries have inhabited a region known as Kurdistan. During the breakup of the 
Ottoman Empire following the end of World War I, the territory of Kurdistan was 
broken up and divided between the modern countries of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. The 
Kurds thus found themselves without an independent homeland, and as unwanted 
minorities in the countries which now exercise control over the territory previously 
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known as Kurdistan. The Kurds, however, have since maintained a strong sense of 
national pride and culture distinct from the Turkish, Persian, and Arabic cultures of the 
countries under whose rule they now find themselves. Recent years have found the 
Kurds fighting for their independence, for the restoration of a Kurdish state: a specific 
piece of territory they can call their own. They have, in short, been fighting for the 
autonomy of their political community, a community which seems based upon the 
common life that Walzer notes. If religious identification were the only thing that 
mattered, the Kurds in Turkey would likely not be fighting for independence since the 
vast majority of Kurds and Turks are both Sunni Muslims. They share a commonality of 
religion, but that apparently is not enough. The fact that even after decades of non-
independent rule they still strongly identify themselves as Kurds, and continue to fight 
for the re-establishment of an independent Kurdish homeland would imply that there is 
more to community and a common life than simply religious affiliation, and that proves 
troublesome for an argument based upon the strength of the umma as a political 
community, as a unified whole who share a singular identity, a common life. 
 One could argue that the Kurdish example may weaken the identification of the 
umma with political community, and with it Al Qaeda’s appeal to “supreme emergency”, 
but not completely undermine it. The maneuver one might take in this regard is to state 
that the issue with the Kurds was related to ethnic differences that reach back for 
centuries and could eventually be overcome by appeal to religious brotherhood. I am not 
entirely convinced of the strength of this approach, but it is one parry that could be made 
nonetheless given statements by bin Laden such as this: 
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Despite what Islam and its people are suffering from at the hands of their 
enemies, the secularist movements, despotic governments, and infidel nations, 
and despite the calamities from which the nation is suffering, … the Muslims are 
still wholly engaged in violent differences, blazing feuds, and issues and matters 
that are not part of the rules of religion or the consensus where differences are 
not permitted (bin Laden 2004, 233) 
   
This appeal to look past differences and unite in Muslim brotherhood would also aid in 
dealing with a particularly thorny issue with the argument forwarded in the last chapter, 
the mistreatment of Palestinian Muslims by the vast majority of the Arab world. 
The Palestinian issue is a significant one in this debate. Most of the vitriolic 
rhetoric spewed by bin Laden has been squarely aimed at what he terms the “Zionist-
Crusader alliance,” by which he primarily means the states of Israel and the United 
States. Bin Laden’s principal issue with the United States is that there have been 
American troops stationed in Saudi Arabia since prior to the Persian-Gulf War in 1991, 
which he views as an occupation of the most sacred lands of the umma since the two 
holiest cities in all of Islam, Mecca and Medina, reside within the borders of Saudi 
Arabia. He takes further issue with the United States’ strong influence in the region and 
continued support of Israel as antagonistic to the nation of Islam. Israel, however, bears 
the brunt of bin Laden’s animosity. Bin Laden’s anger is directed at Israel for a host of 
ills, but especially for what he views as the “occupation” of Jerusalem, the third holiest 
city in Islam. Israel is also charged with further transgressions against members of the 
umma in Palestine - rights violations against Palestinian Muslims. Given bin Laden’s 
conception of the umma, rights violations against Palestinian Muslims are to be viewed 
as rights violations against all Muslims. This assumes, however, that the umma as a 
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political community currently exists. If it does not, then the transference of rights 
violations from one group to the entire community cannot take place. The Kurdish issue 
noted above is one problematic issue for the claim that the umma is a legitimate political 
community in the sense that counts, but the appeal to a process of overcoming internal 
strife might be seen as a means of circumventing this criticism. In my opinion what is 
more damaging, however, is the treatment of the Palestinians at the hands of fellow 
Arabs in the region. The Kurdish case can at least be dismissed on grounds of ethnic and 
cultural differences that may be overcome with dialogue and understanding over time. 
The same does not hold true here. What we see here is clear mistreatment of Arabs by 
fellow Arabs, Muslims by fellow Muslims. There is no obvious ethnic or cultural divide 
to utilize as an excuse.  
For more than sixty years the Palestinian refugees have been relegated to life in 
camps near the Israeli border and have been denied support that could easily be offered 
by the host countries. The Palestinians have been denied access to state health, social 
and educational benefits and in many cases have had to rely upon the United Nations to 
provide when the host countries did not. Under the guise of protecting their right of 
return, Palestinians have also been denied the opportunity to own property or petition for 
citizenship in many of their host countries. These issues are rarely mentioned in the 
appeal to the violation of Palestinian rights usually offered as grounds for directing 
violence against Israel, but, when considered as a whole, it would appear that the 
Palestinians have been used as pawns by other Arab states in the continuing conflict with 
Israel, and this belies any appeal to a common life in the manner that Walzer envisions 
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as worthy of protection. This treatment of the Palestinians undermines, at least to some 
degree, the concept of a currently existing universal Muslim political community, and 
with it causes significant problems for the argument forwarded in the last chapter. It does 
not, however, fully salvage Walzer’s doctrine.  
Earlier in this chapter I stated that even if the argument for Al Qaeda’s adoption 
of Walzer’s “supreme emergency” defense failed, this would not save Walzer’s doctrine. 
My reason for stating this is due to my belief that a modified version of the argument 
could be forwarded on behalf of Hamas or Hezbollah. Let us now consider what form 
this modified argument might take, using Hamas as our model. 
Hamas is a Palestinian Sunni Islamist paramilitary organization and political 
party. Its name, in Arabic, means “zeal” or “enthusiasm”, and is derived from the 
acronym for Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamia, which in Arabic means “Islamic 
Resistance Movement”. Hamas is reported to be divided into three wings: 1) a social and 
political wing, which is responsible for recruitment, social programs, and funding, 2) an 
intelligence wing, whose principal role is internal policing and the identification of 
Israeli collaborators, and 3) a military wing which has been responsible for conducting 
attacks, including the extensive use of suicide bombings, against Israeli military and 
civilian targets. It is the actions of the military wing which has been largely responsible 
for the identification of Hamas as a terrorist organization, especially due to Hamas’ use 
of suicide-bombing as its primary offensive weapon. Their use of suicide-bombers, 
however, is not the sole application of violence to which they have resorted. Hamas has 
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also made frequent use of rocket attacks, and it is the use of these rocket attacks which 
Israel has blamed for its most recent military incursion into Gaza. 
Hamas was formed in late 1987, at the start of the first Intifada, by members of 
the Palestinian arm of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, and began operations in early 1988. 
Its initial charter calls for the establishment of an Islamic state in Palestine, in place of 
Israel and the Palestinian territories, and for the destruction of Israel. From its inception 
Hamas has denied the existence of the state of Israel, calling for its destruction, but this 
call for the destruction of Israel has been muted in recent years, and was dropped from 
the 2006 election manifesto shortly before the elections where Hamas won 74 of the 132 
seats in the Palestinian legislature, giving it majority control of the Palestinian 
government. The success of Hamas in the 2006 election is no doubt due in large part to 
the many social programs they support, such as the funding of schools, healthcare 
clinics, orphanages, and sports leagues, though these programs no doubt serve the 
purpose of recruitment as well as altruism. Hamas is particularly popular with 
Palestinian youths in Gaza, and it is from their ranks where many of the suicide bombers 
that Hamas has employed against Israel have come. 
Having reviewed a small portion of the history of Hamas, in order to provide 
some context for the discussion to follow, I now will to turn to the modified argument I 
alluded to above. If we are to construct for Hamas a version of the argument presented in 
the previous chapter, we will need to see if Hamas can satisfy the three conditions of 
Walzer’s “supreme emergency” defense. Those conditions are justness of cause, 
imminence of defeat, and defeat entailing the destruction of the political community 
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facing defeat. Justness of cause, as we recall, is defined as the use of violence against the 
rights of another. In terms of Hamas, Israel is viewed as the aggressor state. Hamas’ 
ground for identification of Israel as the original aggressor is tied to the establishment of 
the state of Israel. From 1922 until 1948, the territory of Palestine was administered by 
Britain under a Mandate from the League of Nations. This Mandate ended on May 14, 
1948 when Britain relinquished control. In the months leading up to the termination of 
the British Mandate, the newly formed United Nations created a partition plan for 
Palestine that called for the creation of separate Jewish and Arab states in the Palestinian 
lands soon to be independent of British control. That plan included many provisions, but 
the critical provision was the division of the territory into separate Jewish and Arab 
states. The Jewish Agency accepted the partition plan, grudgingly due to restrictions on 
immigration, but the Palestinian Arabs and Arab states rejected it on the ground that the 
partition plan was in violation of the United Nations Charter. Thus, on May 14, 1948, 
when Britain relinquished its Mandate and withdrew it forces, the Jewish Agency 
proclaimed the establishment of the State of Israel upon the lands allotted them by the 
United Nations partition plan. The Palestinian Arabs, however, had not agreed to the 
partition plan, viewing it as a violation of their right to choose their own destiny as 
guaranteed in the United Nations Charter, and thus viewed the establishment of the 
Jewish state on lands they had not ceded as a violation of their territorial rights, which 
led to the first Arab-Israeli war. It is this set of events that is key to the Palestinians 
viewing themselves as victims of aggression, and the reason they do not accept the 
sovereignty of the state of Israel, but instead view it as an occupation of their lands. 
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Hamas, having won majority rule of the Palestinian legislature and with it able to make 
claim as the state representative of the Palestinian people, thus appears to have a claim to 
being the victim of a territorial rights violation, and with that justness of cause. 
The imminence of defeat criterion will be a harder case to make, but one can be 
made, I believe, based upon the significant disparity in military power present in 
Palestine. The Israeli military is a fully modern military and if they so chose could bring 
a great deal of violence upon Hamas strongholds in Gaza and the West Bank in short 
order, as was made evident during the most recent conflict in Gaza during January of 
2009.8 Hamas, by contrast, would not be able to respond with equivalent force. Hamas 
does not possess a tank force, is not in possession of an air wing, nor of any of the 
accouterments of a large modern military force. Their weaponry appears to be limited to 
basic infantry weapons, and supplemented by short-range rockets. Thus, if Israel so 
chose, I believe they could overwhelm Hamas forces with relative ease in a classic set-
piece engagement. This enormous disparity in might that can be brought to bear may 
thus afford an analogy to the British case cited by Walzer in his defense of “supreme 
emergency”. I realize, of course, that in the British case there was no question of Nazi 
Germany’s intent to invade Britain, and that aggressive intent does not seem manifest 
here. As I noted in my first chapter, however, there are questions of Nazi Germany’s 
ability to fulfill that intent. No such questions of the Israeli Defense Forces ability to 
                                                 
8 The recent Israeli attacks inside Gaza were an attempt to quell increased rocket attacks 
by Hamas on Southern Israel. Israeli forces invaded Gaza on January 3, 2009, and 
withdrew on January 21, 2009. Prior to the ground invasion, an air campaign was started 
on December 27, 2008 utilizing F-16 fighter jets and AH-64 apache helicopters and very 
modern ordnance, weaponry which is not available to Hamas. 
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invade are present here. I argued that what allowed Walzer’s case to stand, in light of the 
fact that a successful Nazi invasion of Britain was not as close a threat as Churchill’s 
rhetoric might have led us to believe, was the perception of imminent defeat given the 
situation. If perception of threat is a factor in appeal to “supreme emergency”, as I 
believe it needs to be in order for Walzer’s case to stand, then perception may be 
appealed to here. We may thus, I would grant, have to factor in Palestinian perceptions 
of the threat posed to them by Israel. If they perceive the threat as imminent, which one 
could plausibly argue, and that perception is not wildly exaggerated, then I believe we 
can at least grant that they may have some justification for believing that the criteria of 
imminence has been met, at least until there is sufficient evidence to undermine that 
assumption. 
The gravity of threat criterion will be even harder than the imminence criterion to 
satisfy, but it is possible that an appeal to satisfaction of this criterion can be met given 
Walzer’s insistence upon relationship between community and territory. If Walzer insists 
upon communal identity being tied to shared experience within the confines of specific 
territorial boundaries, then an appeal to satisfaction of this criterion may be made given 
Israeli denial of the “right of return” which Palestinians insist upon. This appeal, 
however, is a weak one, especially in light of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s recent 
address wherein he stated that Israel would be willing to accept “a demilitarized 
Palestinian state” alongside Israel.9 Nevertheless, even with Netanyahu’s concession that 
                                                 
9 CNN, “Israel PM calls for demilitarized Palestinian state,” (14 June 2009). 
<http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/14/israel.netanyahu/index.html> (14 
June 2009). 
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Israel will accept an independent, demilitarized Palestinian state as a neighbor, he 
premised that concession upon Palestinians recognition of Israel as a Jewish state with 
Jerusalem as its capital, and further denied the right of return which Palestinians insist 
upon. Thus, based upon the relationship between community and territory that Walzer 
appears to insist upon, we may grant that the third criterion has been met, albeit weakly. 
What then does this imply for Walzer’s defense of “supreme emergency”? 
Earlier in this chapter I noted that there were two possible ways to attack the 
argument for Al Qaeda’s adoption of Walzer’s “supreme emergency” defense: 1) an 
attack upon Al Qaeda’s authority to issue the appeal to “supreme emergency”, and 2) an 
attack upon the conception of community which formed the basis of their claims. I 
granted that Al Qaeda might ultimately fail the appeal to legitimate authority, but that is 
not the case here. In 2006 Hamas won majority rule of the Palestinian legislature and 
with it status as the ruling party. Their victory in a fair election seems to deny any 
undermining of their claim of access to “supreme emergency” via an attack upon the 
legitimacy requirement of jus ad bellum. Hamas is in a much stronger position here than 
Al Qaeda, and thus can easily repel this particular attack upon their appeal to “supreme 
emergency”. The same is true of the notion of community. Hamas, in its initial charter, 
identifies itself as a distinct Palestinian movement, and while the charter also identifies 
Hamas as connected to the larger world-wide jihad of Islamic fundamentalist groups 
with which it is allied, its cause is primarily a Palestinian one. The arguments and 
appeals that Hamas makes rely solely upon the Palestinian community meeting Walzer’s 
conception of community, whereas Al Qaeda’s arguments require this of the umma of 
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Islam. It would thus appear that the community attack which was successful against Al 
Qaeda’s adoption of “supreme emergency” will not work here. Does this mean that their 
use of terrorism can have a moral defense? I don’t believe so, and my grounds for this 
belief are related to Walzer’s categorical denunciation of terrorism due to the failure of 
most contemporary practitioners to satisfy the jus ad bellum requirement of “last resort”.  
In the Al Qaeda argument forwarded in the last chapter, it appeared that bin Laden did 
conceive of Al Qaeda’s use of indiscriminate violence as a matter of last resort. His 
appeals to the umma to answer the call to jihad at least referenced the apparent failures 
of other means of conflict resolution. Hamas, however, has made no such appeal, in fact 
Hamas denies the validity of any attempt at peaceful resolution in its charter, and has 
resorted to the use of terrorist tactics from its inception. Thus we could argue that 
ultimately their appeal to “supreme emergency” falters due to failure to satisfy the jus ad 
bellum requirement of last resort. Does this undermine a prima facie appeal to “supreme 
emergency” on Hamas’ behalf and in so doing salvage Walzer’s argument? I do not 
believe so.  
In this chapter and the previous chapter I have constructed two cases for the 
adoption of Walzer’s “supreme emergency” defense which, if successful, would have 
provided a defense for contemporary terrorism, a practice which Walzer has 
categorically denied as defensible. Under closer scrutiny the arguments did ultimately 
falter, but it is conceivable that not all such appeals would. It very well could be the case 
that some militant group could be found that was sufficiently like Al Qaeda or Hamas 
that their resort to violence would without a doubt be classified as terrorism. It could 
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likewise be the case that this militant group was sufficiently different from Al Qaeda and 
Hamas so as to not succumb to the same failings that they do. If such a group should 
ever surface, they would then be in a position to adopt an argument similar to the two 
forwarded above, and that would lead to serious inconsistency in Walzer’s overall 
project, an inconsistency which is not merely a mirage produced by the supposed 
paradoxical nature of Walzer’s defense. I therefore believe that Walzer’s doctrine is 
seriously problematic, and its survival would require significant revision. That such 
revision is possible, however, appears unlikely. The apparent best appeal towards this 
end would be a much clearer and stricter definition of political community. As I noted 
above, however, that could lead to a definition which is too restrictive, and thus 
problematic for Walzer’s larger project. A clearer definition of the types of threat which 
qualify for appeal to this doctrine might also be a means of salvaging “supreme 
emergency”, but given that the threat Walzer envisions as sufficient for appeal to 
“supreme emergency” must be threats to political community, it would seem that threat 
and community are related, and any restriction upon threat type might also require 
revision of the conception of community. It is therefore questionable if the appeal to 
“supreme emergency” that Walzer champions is sustainable. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
 When I began this project, I had hoped to discover a means of salvaging 
Walzer’s defense of “supreme emergency” from the problems I saw. It was my belief 
then, as now, that situations of “supreme emergency” sadly do sometimes manifest, and 
thus some means of providing a moral defense for actions which are deemed as 
necessary during such extreme situations could be given. I saw Walzer’s argument as a 
well-reasoned defense of the old adage “desperate times call for desperate measures”, 
and took comfort in his “dirty hands” approach which required that the actions 
themselves do not cease to be immoral. It was the appeal to necessity which was being 
defended, not the action itself. I agreed with Walzer that in extreme situations, those 
which would require good people to do bad things, the agents in these cases should feel 
guilty. It is a natural part of the human experience, and Walzer’s argument maintained 
this component. I was nevertheless troubled by the apparent inconsistency in this 
approach, a fact noted by many of his critics, and was unsure at the outset how he was 
able to respond that no such inconsistency was present. The appearance of inconsistency, 
according to Walzer, was a product of the “paradoxical nature” of the defense. After 
reviewing his work in detail, I now understand why he concludes that there is no internal 
contradiction. His argument is not a defense of immoral action, but a defense solely of 
the resort to immoral action when no other options exist.  I thus sought some means of 
salvaging his argument from the significant problems I found. 
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My initial intuition was that the broadness I found in the “supreme emergency” 
defense might be resolved with further restriction of one or more of the key elements of 
the argument. I thought that perhaps a clearer definition of “community” or a stricter 
interpretation of threats sufficient for the appeal might resolve the dilemma I found. I 
now see, however, that such is not possible.  
I noted that the conception of community with which Walzer is working is 
vague. He does not present any strict definition of the term “community”, instead opting 
to focus upon the “common life” which he views as the fundamental basis of 
community. The “common life” is the defining feature, and it is insistence upon this 
point that makes further restriction impossible. The basic human right to liberty enjoyed 
by all members of the community entails the autonomy of the community to come 
together under whatever political structures they see fit. To attempt to restrict the 
conception of community in a fashion that might salvage Walzer’s “supreme 
emergency” defense would undermine this basic communal autonomy, and with it 
impinge upon the fundamental rights that the members enjoy. Thus attempting to modify 
the notion of community in order to rescue this small facet of Walzer’s project would 
undermine Walzer’s project as a whole. I therefore do not believe that a stricter sense of 
community is available which would save the “supreme emergency” defense without 
seriously damaging Walzer’s larger project of defending the Bellum Justum. 
I find a similar difficulty in attempting to more carefully define the threats 
sufficient for appeal to the “supreme emergency” defense. My reason for concluding this 
is tied to the fact that the types of threats which allow appeal to Walzer’s defense are 
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related to community. The only threats sufficient to justify appeal to the overriding of jus 
in bello are threats to the character of the community under attack. Any attempt at a 
stricter definition of threats sufficient to count for appeal to the doctrine of “supreme 
emergency” must therefore necessarily be tied to the conception of community. The 
nature of the threats must be of the sort that they attack the common life of the 
community and that conception of a common life, as noted above, must be left broad in 
order to preserve the autonomy of the community’s membership. I thus see no purchase 
in attempting to salvage “supreme emergency” through refinement of the nature of the 
threats sufficient for appeal to Walzer’s doctrine. 
 Given the inability to refine either of these two fundamental concepts in a 
manner sufficient to protect Walzer’s defense of “supreme emergency” from attacks 
such as those I have levied in this thesis, I must conclude that the doctrine cannot be 
maintained. There simply is no way that I can find of salvaging Walzer’s argument as it 
is presently constructed. It may stand as an excuse for the resort to immoral action, and 
thus allow us to view those who are in crisis with a greater degree of sympathy should 
they find no other course of action, but Walzer’s argument for a “supreme emergency” 
exemption from jus in bello cannot stand as a moral defense. 
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